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This chapter is particularly concerned with the status of  history, dance 
history especially, within Dance Studies. ‘History’ to quote dance scholar 
Janet O’Shea, ‘like dance analysis, offered Dance Studies a tangible object 
for interpretation and thus served as a means to validate an otherwise 
ephemeral art’ (O’Shea 2010: 11). O’Shea, then, understands history 
as functioning as epistemological support. Dance history aided the 
emergence of  dance as a disciplinary subject, at an early, critical stage in 
its development. Yet what has befallen the more recent status of  history 
within Dance Studies, now that Dance Studies is better established, 
relatively speaking, within the academy? Having been strategically 
co-opted in this way; to shore up dance in its infancy as a legitimate 
subject worthy of  study and research, is dance history’s own future as 
secure? What, then, becomes of  (dance) history? If  history is not actually 
discarded, is it at least demoted? Indeed, is history, having fulfilled its 
purpose in enabling the disciplinary plant to take root, so much scaffolding 
waiting to be dismantled? The University of  California/Riverside Dance 
Doctoral Programme, founded in 1993, previously awarded PhDs in 
Dance History and Theory. It now confers PhDs in Critical Dance Studies.1 
Following their relatively recent merger in 2017, the Society for Dance 
History Scholars (SDHS) and Council on Research in Dance (CORD), the 
two main, USA-based research or learned societies for dance, operate 
under the umbrella title of  the Dance Studies Association (DSA), with 
the previous historical designation similarly discarded. The new title, in 
closely echoing that of  the Cultural Studies Association (CSA) established 
in the USA in 2008, might also be said to point, neatly, to Dance Studies’ 
methodological indebtedness to, and alliance with, Cultural Studies. This 
recent excision of  history from key Dance Studies nomenclature might 
indicate the demotion of  history by Dance Studies, as does the somewhat 
beleaguered status of  dance history within British HE, as described by 
dance historian Alexandra Carter (see Carter 2007). 
Some of  this apparent antipathy towards history might reasonably 
be ascribed to the oedipal desire of  the younger discipline to extinguish 
or retire its disciplinary parent in the ways implied by the changes in 
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nomenclature described above. Yet if  Dance Studies does indeed betray an 
anti-historical bias, what additional underlying disciplinary rationale(s), 
beyond this oedipal impulse, might have triggered this antipathy towards 
history? Three factors will be identified and proposed as having particular 
significance in this connection, imbuing this chapter with a tri-partite 
structure. The first concerns the already noted strong imprint of  Cultural 
Studies on Dance Studies and the possible bearing of  this imprint on 
dance history’s status within Dance Studies. For the particular manner 
in which Dance Studies has construed Cultural Studies may, this chapter 
will suggest, have impacted upon dance history’s standing within 
communities of  dance scholarship. The second factor has to do with the 
implications, for dance history, of  a particular critique based in a branch of  
dance scholarship, that perceives phenomenology, which it deems a good 
fit for dance inquiry, as inherently antithetical to history. In particular, 
this critique takes the work of  philosopher Michel Foucault – which it 
identifies closely with, and as, historical practice – as incompatible with 
dance enquiry. Incompatibility is staked on the twin grounds of  Foucault’s 
break with, and supposed resulting and enduring antipathy towards, 
phenomenology; and his perceived embrace of  history which is, itself, 
also understood to result from such a break. In effect, then, this critique 
questions the very suitability, for dance research, of  approaches based in 
history-focused inquiry. The ability to call this critique into question, in 
the ways that the present discussion, in seeking to rehabilitate Foucault, 
and so history, needs to demonstrate, constitutes the third factor. This 
final factor makes two particular, further demands of  this chapter. 
Namely that the interrelated questions of  Foucault, phenomenology, and 
dance; and of  the position which phenomenology has itself  adopted in 
relation to history, be re-visited and re-evaluated to the extent that space 
reasonably allows. Fortunately, these interrelated questions are ones 
which have – relatively recently – preoccupied scholarship on Foucault, 
and on phenomenology, respectively. This preoccupation may in and of  
itself  be one possible indicator that there is indeed more at stake, and 
so to consider, regarding both questions, than the lines drawn by the 
aforementioned critique might suggest. Attention turns first, however, 
to the long-standing and enduring identification of  Dance Studies with 
Cultural Studies. It is with the already commented upon and potentially 
quite far-reaching implications – for the status of  (dance) history as part 
of  dance-based research – of  Dance Studies’ indebtedness to Cultural 
Studies, that this chapter begins its analysis. 
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The Trouble with History for Dance Studies                                                         
i): Cultural Studies/Dance Studies and History 
Dance historian and critic Gay Morris, as part of  her nuanced and 
considered investigation into the ‘greater alliance between dance 
scholarship and Cultural Studies’, draws what she perceives as the critical 
distinction in Dance Studies between Cultural Studies-inflected dance 
scholarship and the rest: ‘Although [writes Morris] there are a number 
of  researchers within the dance field who continue to employ old models, 
reflecting the spectrum of  work that exists in all fields, the most influential 
research incorporates elements that cultural studies pioneered.’ (Morris 
2009: 82; 93). This methodological weighting of  Dance Studies heavily 
in favour of  Cultural Studies begs an ancillary question, concerning the 
implications of  privileging Cultural Studies like this. To put it another 
way, is building the foundations of  Dance Studies on any one disciplinary 
support potentially almost as problematic as hanging on to tired and 
outmoded orthodoxies; as ‘continu[ing to] employ old models’, to quote 
Morris? And is the adoption of  the stance which Morris describes especially 
misguided, running, as it does, counter to Cultural Studies’ own avowed 
and in part, Gramsci-inspired, project to dismantle hegemonic positions? 
In other words, is there not an inescapable tension; an ironic contradiction 
even, between the very methodological plurality advocated by Cultural 
Studies and Dance Studies’ own tight-hold embrace of  Cultural Studies? 
As Morris points out, ‘cultural studies was initially meant as a political 
and social intervention that purposefully avoided creating theories of  its 
own’ (Morris 2009: 82). This resulted in Cultural Studies, in comparison 
with other academic fields, being ‘[markedly] less concerned with 
disciplinary identity’ (LaCapra 2004: 117). Viewed in this light, does not 
Dance Studies, by virtue of  its strong identification with Cultural Studies 
as a singular methodological lodestar to be prioritised above all others, 
in the way Morris describes, actually start to move out of  kilter with 
Cultural Studies? For, in its very privileging of  Cultural Studies, Dance 
Studies seems unaware of  Cultural Studies’ own purposeful dismantling 
of  inter- and intra-disciplinary hierarchies and deliberate disregard for 
its own claims to disciplinary status. The point here is certainly not to 
deride Cultural Studies: the significance of  its legacy for Dance Studies 
is hard to over-estimate bringing, as it does, ‘dance into contact with 
other fields that have intersected with literary studies for some time, 
particularly gender and women’s studies, but also American studies, film 
studies, African American studies, and ethnic studies’ (Goellner and Shea 
Murphy 1995: 3). 
Yet this prioritising of  Cultural Studies, as the singular methodological 
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driver of  Dance Studies, to be privileged above all other disciplinary tools, 
not only seems insufficiently attentive to Cultural Studies’ foundational 
scepticism where hegemonies and disciplinarity are concerned. It also 
arguably betrays some of  the same and, so it would seem, enduring 
anxiety felt on behalf  of  dance, over its institutional status and need to 
shore up its disciplinary credentials, with which this chapter began. For 
according to cultural historian and theorist Dominick LaCapra:   
A sign of  excessive professionalization of  a discipline is the unwillingness 
to take seriously and try to come to terms with the views of  commentators 
or critics not within one’s own guild, and such a tendency may mark both 
epistemologically conservative scholars and those who take themselves to 
be radical or avant-garde.  (LaCapra 2004: 79).
Issues concerning the governing orthodoxies that have come to mark 
Dance Studies are significant and deserving of  scrutiny because, as 
Eniko Jakab and Jasmina Lukic note in their 2005 comparative study of  
disciplinization in European universities, ‘processes of  disciplinization are 
directly related to issues of  power in academia’ (Jakab and Lukic 2005: 
5). To put it another way, as gender studies theorists Gabriele Griffin et 
al observe, ‘in order to be rewarded it is best to work within the canon 
of  the given discipline’ (Griffin et al. quoted in Jakab and Lukic 2005: 
9). Griffin et al. have the UK national and universities-focused research 
assessment framework expressly in mind. But beyond the immediate 
career prospects of  individual researchers, or rankings – in terms of  
relative research status, with consequences for research funding – of  
particular university departments, the consequences of  establishing 
new disciplinary hegemonies, however inadvertently or unintentionally, 
have far-reaching implications. For at what point does the intellectual 
bifurcation of  a discipline – in this case, Dance Studies – into what are, in 
effect, new orthodoxies and ‘the rest’, in the way Morris describes, stand 
in the way of  its very maturation and so, paradoxically, itself  become an 
obstacle to innovation in dance-based research? Much therefore is at stake 
for Dance Studies, in the consigning of  (dance) history as an outlier of  its 
disciplinary canon. Consequently, it is worth investigating – historicising, 
if  you will – the circumstances underlying the allocation of  this status to 
history by Dance Studies, in the ways in which this chapter proposes. 
One dividend of  this weddedness of  Dance Studies to Cultural Studies 
has been a willingness to question and reject conservative historical 
practices; to problematise history as disciplinarily moribund. Cultural 
Studies imparted to Dance Studies – at least in its Anglo-American 
configuration – a healthy scepticism about history as master discourse. 
To quote cultural theorist Stuart Hall, ‘histories and touchstones of  the 
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national culture, transmitted to a select number of  people […are] in their 
keeping, the keeping of  a particular literary [or other] elite’ (Hall 1990: 13; 
14). Cultural Studies, therefore, arguably offered Dance Studies an escape 
from some of  the limitations of  history as practised more conventionally. 
English scholar Amy Koritz’s comments of  1996, expressing a sense of  
frustration over the perceived limitations of  paradigms which she regards 
as, at that stage, dominant in dance history, would seem to indicate this: 
Dance historians of  all persuasions would benefit from an ability to 
understand and to position themselves in relation to the larger intellectual 
communities of  scholarship in the arts and humanities, and for this reason 
alone it is important to think through the possible relationship of  dance 
history to cultural studies (Koritz 1996: 79). 
Art historian Norman Bryson understands the aforementioned 
California/Riverside ‘Choreographing History’ conference of  1992 (see 
endnote 1), which he attended, as potentially having served such a role, 
for it ‘reconnect[ed] that beleaguered underground [of  dance historians] 
with those lucky enough to be working in fields better established in terms 
of  grants, jobs, journals, and university recognition.’ (Bryson 1997: 57). 
It seems Bryson especially had in mind the exposure which the conference 
enabled to ‘colleagues in comparative literature or art history’, given that 
dance historians were ‘surreptitiously absorbing the same intellectual 
influences that were having such an impact’ on these fields (Bryson 1997: 
57). 
But this chapter intervenes to ask whether Dance Studies has too 
often been overly hasty and unnecessarily harsh in its condemnation of  
history?  Has dance (as) history therefore paid too high a price for Cultural 
Studies’ instrumentality in the genesis of  Dance Studies? Has a guilty by 
association argument too often led to the confusion or equation of  history-
as-master-narrative with history more generally, and so to Dance Studies’ 
rejection of, or at least scepticism towards, historical method, per se, as 
contaminated and altogether too compromised? Or, more prosaically but 
equally damagingly, has history come to be regarded by Dance Studies as 
outmoded and so with relatively little to offer to a comparatively young 
discipline?  
One way to begin addressing these questions might be by directing 
attention to the seriousness with which Cultural Studies has itself  taken 
history, as a way of  encouraging Dance Studies to follow Cultural Studies’ 
lead in taking history seriously. In other words, if  Dance Studies’ relegation 
of  history is actually a misreading of  Cultural Studies’ own position vis-
à-vis history, it would follow that the responsibility for this relegation 
lies with Dance Studies rather than Cultural Studies. As Morris points 
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out, Richard Hoggart; Raymond Williams; and E.P. Thompson, as key 
foundational thinkers for Cultural Studies, advocated historical method. 
Morris stresses ‘[how] [f]or Hoggart […] specificity of  time and place 
became other important elements for cultural studies’; ‘[how] Thompson 
stressed what would become important concepts in Cultural Studies. 
These included historical and geographical specificity.’ (Morris 2009: 85; 
86). This is even if  E.P. Thompson would eventually break with Cultural 
Studies.2 Might the responsibility for Dance Studies’ misinterpretation, 
and at least partial dismissal, of  history therefore lie with Dance Studies’ 
misconstrual of  Cultural Studies; in Dance Studies’ misreading – as overly 
hostile – of  Cultural Studies’ relationship with history? There are enough 
salient indicators, pointing to the worth, or – to use a Cultural Studies 
term – cultural value, actually vested in history by Cultural Studies, to 
suggest that this may indeed be the case. The position which Hall himself  
adopted in relation to history, as set out in his own writing, might indicate 
this. Hall’s critical role in the establishment of  Cultural Studies as a 
vibrant strand of  British intellectual and artistic life makes his own stated 
position in relation to history a doubly good place to start, in this regard. 
Redeeming History for Dance Studies                                                                   
i) Hall and History
Although Hall was at pains to point out that he was not a historian, he 
was quick to identify with historical projects: ‘Not being a historian I 
was not directly involved in the founding of  History Workshop Journal, 
but remained engaged with its wider project – including the recovery 
of  neglected, hidden and subaltern histories’, Hall wrote in the 2006 
edition of  that journal, as part of  an article in which he also described 
his ‘approach’ as ‘historical’ (Hall 2006: 1-2; 3). ‘Or since I have already 
confessed to not being a historian, I had better settle for “genealogical”. I 
want to begin to construct an outline “genealogy” of  the post-war Black 
British diaspora arts’, Hall proposed in the Raphael Samuel Memorial 
Lecture which he gave in 2004 (Hall 2006: 3). According to Hallian 
cultural theorist Angela McRobbie, this lecture, subsequently published 
in History Workshop Journal, was one of  Hall’s ‘most succinct accounts 
of  his engagement with black and Asian British artists’ (McRobbie Ms. 
undated with npn but: 14).3 In this article Hall ‘offers a wider and more 
historical account’ of  what McRobbie terms the ‘conditions of  emergence’ 
for those Black British diaspora artists whom Hall considers (McRobbie 
Ms undated with npn but: 14). For all of  Hall’s modesty where thinking 
historically is concerned, his lecture/article conceives of  its subjects in 
terms that are very much attuned to history: ‘Cultural identities come 
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from somewhere, have histories’, wrote Hall, at the start of  an extended 
quotation from ‘Cultural Identity and Diaspora’, his earlier, seminal essay. 
‘Like everything which is historical’ continues Hall:
they [identities] undergo constant transformation. Far from being eternally 
fixed in some essentialised past, they are subject to the continuous ‘play’ of  
history, culture and power. Far from being grounded in a mere ‘recovery’ 
of  the past which is waiting to be found, and which, when found, would 
secure our sense of  ourselves into eternity, identities are the names we give 
to the different ways we are positioned and position ourselves within the 
narratives of  the past.   (Hall 2006: 19).4
The seriousness with which Hall takes history in this quotation – one that 
will be returned to later – is in keeping with the artists whose genealogy 
his lecture and article set out to map; (film) artists such as John Akomfah 
and Isaac Julien who would themselves in turn seek to engage historically 
with Hall’s legacy. In what McRobbie, following Hall, terms the ‘third 
space of  black cultural production’:
Akomfrah and Julien, echoing Stuart’s own pedagogic style, announced 
a presence which was other than modernity, staking a distance from 
the avant-garde while also refusing the playful shiny surfaces of  the 
postmodern. History here was reduced neither to pastiche nor to ‘costume 
drama’, instead it was urgently disputatious, a matter of  non-chronological 
questions about temporality, confronting what Bhabha called the ‘time 
lag’ of  modernity. With original footage Isaac Julien had Langston Hughes 
dance forward with his poetry-rap of  the Harlem Renaissance interrupting 
the slower and carefully composed images of  black gay desire as played out 
in the spaces of  contemporary club scenes (McRobbie Ms undated with 
npn, but: 11-12).
Akomfrah, a co-founder of  the Black Audio Film Collective, a ‘cinecultural 
collective project’ (Korossi, in Fisher et al., nd but 2013/2014: 7), 
produces work that is highly invested in the archive and what Akomfrah 
terms the ‘ballast of  [the] historical’ (Akomfrah, 2015: n.p.). Akomfrah’s 
The Stuart Hall Project (2013), a ninety-minute film which uses material 
drawn from over 800 hours of  archival footage to document the life 
and work of  Stuart Hall, and its companion piece, the shorter, three-
screen gallery installation The Unfinished Conversation (2014), are cases 
in point. ‘Even though it runs for twice the length, The Stuart Hall Project 
must be seen as a contraction of  Akomfrah’s astonishing installation’ 
writes cultural theorist Mark Fisher of  The Unfinished Conversation (Fisher 
in Fisher et al, nd but 2013/2014: 1). This triple-screen installation, 
displayed over an extended period at the Tanks, the space given over to 
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live art, performance, film and video at London’s Tate Modern, where it 
was viewed by the present writer, is set to a bricolage score of  Miles Davis 
standards. According to Fisher, the music provides ‘a parallel narrative – 
a different, yet intersecting route through the same historical period that 
the film tracks’ (Fisher in Fisher et al., nd but 2013/2014: 3). Akomfrah 
describes how his installation triptych is based on Hall’s ‘writings about 
identity, formed as an intersection with history’ and Africana and feminist 
scholar Tina Campt similarly identifies historicism as the denominator 
Akomfrah shares with Hall. Speaking at MoMA in New York, as part of  a 
panel on Hall to mark the display of  The Unfinished Conversation, included 
in a MoMA exhibition devoted to Akomfrah’s work in 2017, Campt 
had a particular quote from Hall especially in mind, in this regard. ‘In 
a lot of  ways it’s what I think of  as the bookend, or spine, between The 
Stuart Hall Project and The Unfinished Conversation’, Campt commented, 
by way of  introducing the same extended passage from Hall’s ‘Cultural 
Identity and Diaspora’ essay, quoted by Hall in his History Workshop 
Journal article, and already reproduced above (Campt speaking as part 
of  Akomfrah et al 2017). In reading this quotation aloud, Campt placed 
special vocal emphasis on ‘history’, separating it from the words that 
immediately follow. This stress on history is borne out by Akomfrah’s 
close identification with what, for him, is Hall’s same ‘insistence on the 
historical; on questions of  temporality; his foregrounding of  temporality, 
of  time, and the registrations of  time’. ‘I want to hang on to his [Hall’s] 
understandings of  the ways in which moments in the now are shaped 
by vectors and events from elsewhere, basically from the past’, Akomfrah 
stressed (Akomfrah in conversation with Cameron Bailey in Akomfrah 
et al. 2017). At the time of  writing, three London gallery/museum 
spaces feature Akomfrah works that attest to his enduring historicism. 
These include Mimesis: African Soldier (2018), an Imperial War Museum-
housed ‘three-screen installation’ commissioned for the World War One 
centenary. Termed ‘vintage Akomfrah’, Mimesis fuses ‘highly wrought 
historical documentary and cryptic evocations of  lived experience, using 
actors (always silent), archive film and photographs, ethnographic sound 
recordings, new filmed material…’ (Harding 2018: 19).
Cultural Studies’ commitment to history, so palpable, then, both in 
Hall’s writing and in the historicism he seeded in those who follow him – 
artists and scholars alike – is in marked contrast to Dance Studies’ relative 
antipathy towards history. And so it would seem that this enduring 
disregard, where history is concerned, is in spite – and not because – of  
Dance Studies’ emergence as a disciplinary child of  Cultural Studies. 
Commenting over a decade ago now, Carter, for instance, lamented how: 
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[f]or many [dance] students entering higher education, therefore, ‘dance 
history’ is an alien field of  knowledge and, compared with practice-based 
work, it is not initially an enticing one. To compound this situation, 
university curricula are increasingly prescribed, pressurised and packaged, 
to the extent that dance history as a core or compulsory module might 
seem to be something of  a luxury.
[…A]nd even when wholly written [BA] theses are submitted they tend 
not to be on history per se. Furthermore […], even accepting the difficulties 
of  getting any dance book published, British [dance] scholars are not 
producing [dance] history books (Carter 2007: 123; 124).
And writing a decade after Carter, fellow British dance historian Michael 
Huxley describes an unchanged climate where publishing is concerned: 
‘A few accounts detail modern [early to mid-twentieth-century] dance 
as a transatlantic phenomenon and there are very few that consider the 
modern dance in the United Kingdom. Much of  the literature is focused on 
individual artists […]’ (Huxley 2015: 43, note 4).   
How else, then, to account for the relative antipathy towards history that 
seems regularly to characterise Dance Studies? What other factors could 
help explain this attitude, beyond a disciplinary inattentiveness, on the 
part of  Dance Studies, to the seriousness with which Cultural Studies takes 
history, that has been the focus of  discussion so far? One such additional 
factor to consider might be the critique, based in a certain reading of  
phenomenology in relation to dance and its study, that questions the very 
suitability of  history-driven analysis for dance inquiry. It is to this critique 
that attention now turns. Stuart Hall’s conceptualisation of  how identities 
are constituted, given its apparent acknowledgement of  Foucault, arcs 
neatly to consideration of  this critique. For nominating Foucault as a 
scholar whose work it considers as synonymous with historical practice, 
this critique understands Foucault’s historicist disposition as resulting 
directly from what it construes as his break from, and subsequent 
enduring antipathy towards, phenomenology. If  Hall’s ‘[self-]confess[ed]…
genealogical [method]’ acknowledges Foucault, Hall’s conceptualisation 
of  identities formed under the effects of  history, again demonstrates an 
indebtedness to Foucauldian histories: identities, in Hall’s understanding, 
are ‘far from being eternally fixed in some essentialised past, they are subject 
to the continuous play of  history, culture, and power’, just as Foucault’s 
genealogies were conceived with the intention, to quote philosopher 
Pascal Michon, of  ‘showing the historical construction of  what we take 
for [or, to be] natural and transcendental’ (Michon 2002: 175). And if  
Hall’s genealogies borrow from Foucault, Foucault neatly echoed Hall’s 
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‘confess[ion] to not being a historian’, declaring of  himself  ‘I’m not a 
professional historian; [but] nobody is perfect.’ (Foucault quoted in Megill 
1987: 117). This last comment, in keeping with Foucault’s attempt ‘in 
his histories (as well as in his less easily labelled historical works) to break 
with the conventions of  the discipline, to push out its boundaries’ (O’Brien 
1989: 32), is something that will be returned to later.          
The Trouble with History for Dance Studies                                                        
ii): Phenomenology, Foucault, Dance, and History
One such phenomenological approach to ‘dance inquiry’ is presented 
by dance anthropologist Sally Ann Ness in her critique of  the work of  
Michel Foucault (Ness 2011: 22). In Ness’s estimation it is ‘Foucault’s 
anti-phenomenological turn’ that has such a ‘distort[ing]’ effect on and 
for ‘the analysis of  dance’ (Ness 2011: 23). And for Ness, history is always 
implicated in Foucault’s perceived turn away from phenomenology: 
‘Foucault’s own rejection of  the subject of  phenomenology hinges on 
that subject’s inappropriateness for analysis of  scientific discourse that 
is historical in orientation – his own particular research interest’, Ness 
maintains (Ness 2011: 23). Here, blame is quite explicitly laid at history’s 
feet: Ness asks:  
[w]hat are the consequences of  giving unqualified priority to forms of  
analysis that foreground historical phenomena and historical processes 
in the intellectual study of  dance? To follow Foucault away from 
phenomenology […] is to posit that the historical aspects of  dance and 
choreography are the key to critical insight. The disciplinary alignment 
privileges absolutely an historical perspective [...]  (Ness 2011: 23).
In Ness’s assessment, ‘the importance of  this historical orientation cannot 
be overstated in terms of  its influence on Foucault’s theoretical approach 
[…] Foucault’s approach is historical in its basic character giving priority 
to relationships between the past and present’ (Ness 2011: 23). ‘To follow 
Foucault’s lead’ then is, according to Ness:
to forego analyses that would give priority to the identification of  that 
which is definitively emergent or categorically ahistorical in choreographic 
performance. It would preempt analyses that seek to orient to the 
immanent and the manifesting, as well as the virtual relations of  dance 
[…]. In sum, the replacement of  a phenomenological with a thoroughly 
historicized subjectivity forecloses inquiry into the more radically creative, 
emergent (and even liberatory and agentive) forms of  danced existence 
and intelligence (Ness 2011: 23).   
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Quoting philosopher Todd May, Ness regards Foucault’s work as always 
‘“defin[ing] itself  against phenomenology”’ (May, ‘Foucault’s Relation to 
Phenomenology’,5 quoted by Ness 2011: 20; italics are May’s). Given its 
substantive bearing on perceptions of  Foucault as a problematic thinker 
where dance is concerned, it is the characterisation offered by Ness, of  
Foucault as persistently anti-phenomenological, which this chapter 
sets out to question and at least in part reverse. To the extent that space 
allows, phenomenology’s dense web of  relationships with history will 
be returned to later. This will be with a view to testing the hypothesis 
that phenomenological and historical approaches are necessarily 
incommensurate with one another, in the ways that Ness seems to 
imply. First though it is helpful to pause to consider whether Foucault’s 
antipathy towards phenomenology was indeed as absolute as Ness’s 
assessment would suggest.
It may well be that in building the case for Foucault’s inattentiveness to 
the agency of  the body, there has been a tendency towards over-valuing 
certain of  Foucault’s texts such as Discipline and Punish: The Birth of  the 
Prison.6  This reliance is something which Ness, who notes this text as ‘the 
[Foucault] work that is among the most often cited in dance analysis’, 
herself  stresses (Ness 2011: 25). Ness frequently cites this text in her 
article, using its original French title, Surveiller et punir. Naissance de la 
prison, (Ness 2011: 25; see for example 19; 26). As Ness also points out, 
‘[i]ndeed, the very mention of  the term “discipline” in current dance 
scholarship (and many related fields as well) more or less automatically 
makes reference to Foucault’s genealogical study of  incarceration, 
Surveiller et punir […]’ (Ness 2011: 19). And yet ‘discipline’ as a term 
of  reference, may misrepresent, quite fundamentally, Foucault’s text. 
According to Foucault specialist Stuart Elden, ‘Surveiller et punir does 
not translate as “discipline and punish”. Survey and Punish would be a 
closer title of  the book.’ (Elden 2014). ‘“Survey” […] is […] an attempt 
to render “Surveiller”, whereas “Discipline” avoids it entirely’ continues 
Elden, in a research blog entry arguing for a new translation of  this 
key Foucault text (Elden 2014). Other Foucault scholars responded in 
support and with offers of  other titles, Stephanie Martens suggesting 
‘“[To] Watch and [to] punish”’. Significantly, Martens’ alternative title is 
more Existentialist given that – as she points out – it captures ‘“veiller sur” 
(watching and caring both being part, in complex ways, of  “surveiller”).’ 
(Martens’ post on Elden 2014). And Elden considers that mis-, or at least 
partial, representation of  Foucault’s original text extends to other aspects 
of  ‘the English version [which] only includes some of  the images from 
the French. […]. Tellingly, the English edition tends to have the ones most 
directly related to the prison, whereas the French edition, and of  course 
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the text itself, brings in a much wider range of  examples’ (Elden 2014). 
In texts such as Discipline and Punish Foucault’s ‘canvas [was] thick with 
bodies – bodies in hospitals, in clinics, in asylums, and in prisons’ (O’Brien 
1989: 35). And as Ness observes, in works such as these, Foucault is 
generally understood, including by Dance Studies, to have constructed 
the body as subjugated and subject to surveillance. In other, typically 
later, texts however, Foucault conceives of  the body in markedly different, 
decidedly less passive, terms. In beginning to assess whether it is still 
tenable to read Foucault as entirely or irrevocably anti-phenomenological 
in light of  these later texts, it may be helpful to take into account the 
time at which Ness was writing. The Courage of  the Truth, for instance, 
as the last series of  Collège de France lectures Foucault delivered before 
his death, was only published in English translation in 2011, the year in 
which Ness’s article was also published. The original, French-language 
version of  The Courage of  the Truth, which had appeared in 2005, forms 
a constituent part of  ‘the publication of  Foucault’s lectures on parrhēsia 
– roughly, frank speech that puts the speaker at considerable risk’ (Hull 
2018: 251). As such, according to philosopher Gordon Hull, ‘it invites 
a general reassessment of  his late work.’ (Hull 2018: 251). In fact, Ness 
tends to focus on what she terms ‘the “early Foucault’s lead”’, that is, on 
‘the relatively early Foucault texts that have been most at issue for dance 
theory’ (Ness 2011: 20; note 4, 29). May, on whose work Ness draws, 
similarly focuses his consideration of  Foucault and phenomenology 
around early Foucault works (May 2005). Hitherto unpublished Foucault 
texts however, some landmark ones among them, continue to be made 
available posthumously, three plus decades after Foucault’s death. 
Volume IV of  The History of  Sexuality, for instance, was only published in 
French as recently as 2018, as this chapter was being written.7 Moreover, 
the Foucault publishing enterprise is projected to continue well into the 
foreseeable future. It is not inconceivable that Dance (Studies) may want 
to turn to at least some of  this enterprise. This would particularly be 
the case if  Foucault’s anti-phenomenological stance can be brought into 
question, and consequently some of  the supposed stigma surrounding 
Foucault, for dance, be removed.   
The agency clearly ceded to the body in the late Foucault of  The Courage 
of  the Truth, as a capable – indeed invaluable – vessel for the practice of  
radical, Cynic philosophy, might serve to encourage dance scholars to 
return to, and re-evaluate, the historical – that is historian – Foucault.8 
For Cynicism, in Foucault’s understanding and extended analysis – he 
offers in effect a history of  Cynicism in Hellenistic Greece and ancient 
Rome – relies upon a highly motile and ambulatory, agental rather than 
subjugated, notion of  embodiment, one which at times also calls to mind 
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a theatricalised body. This is something Foucault repeatedly stresses, 
placing emphasis, for instance, on the ‘Cynic’s body and comportment’; 
on how it is the job of  the Cynic ‘to prove with the qualities of  his [or her] 
body’ (Foucault 2011: 310); on Cynicism as less ‘a doctrine’ and much 
more ‘an attitude, a way of  being’ (Foucault 2011: 178). It is therefore 
hard to square the agency ceded to embodiment in lecture series such 
as The Courage of  the Truth, with Ness’s assertion that the corporeal is 
‘in general’, for Foucault, ‘a kind of  prison’ (Ness 2011: 26). Indeed, 
according to philosopher Richard Shusterman, the same Foucault who: 
showed how ‘docile bodies’ were systematically yet subtly, secretly shaped 
by seemingly innocent body disciplines and regimes of  biopower so as 
to advance oppressive socio-political agendas and institutions, emerges 
also as the pragmatic methodologist proposing alternative body practices 
to overcome the repressive ideologies covertly entrenched in our docile 
bodies (Shusterman 2008: 29).  
This is to the extent that Foucault, in Shusterman’s estimation, practices 
a variant of  ‘somaesthetics’. In fact, for Shusterman, somaesthetics, as 
a ‘discipline’ which ‘puts the body’s experience and artful refashioning 
back into the heart of  philosophy as an art of  living’, was even ‘inspired 
by Foucault’s embodied vision of  care for the self ’ (Shusterman 2008: 15; 
23). ‘Somaesthetics, as I conceive it, has three fundamental branches, 
all powerfully present in Foucault’, writes Shusterman, for whom ‘his 
[Foucault’s] somaesthetics confronts us (even affronts us) with the crucial 
issue: conceived as an art of  living, philosophy should attend more closely 
to cultivating the sentient body through which we live’ (Shusterman 
2008: 23; 48).
Understood in this way, Foucault’s investment in the attitudinal 
potential of  embodiment modifies Ness’s assertions that, following his 
early break with phenomenology, ‘the primacy of  experienced, embodied 
but object oriented, transcendental consciousness was replaced by the 
primacy of  historicised conceptuality’; and that Foucault was ‘never to 
return to either the mainstreams or the margins of  phenomenological 
investigation’ (Ness 2011:  25; 20). Furthermore, the central responsibility 
of  the Cynic is, according to Foucault, ‘the staging [through his or her 
body] of  life under the real gaze of  others … of  the greatest possible number 
of  others’ (Foucault 2011: 253). As such, the Cynic’s principal concern is 
with ‘a dramatization of  the principle of  life […] this dramatization of  the 
principle of  independence in the form of  life itself, of  physical, material 
life […]’ (Foucault 2011: 256). This is to the extent that the Cynic, for 
Foucault, ‘is the very being of  the true, rendered visible through the body.’ 
(Foucault 2011: 310). As, in effect, close synonyms for the act of  dancing 
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itself, the small sample, offered here, of  Foucault’s many observations on 
Cynicism, might bring into question; or be brought into useful dialogue 
with, Foucault’s supposed antipathy to dance and its close cognates. 
According to Ness: 
a Foucaultian conceptualist perspective implies that dance enquiry can 
and indeed must depart from its dancing subjects, its living, experiencing 
corporeal beings, in order to maintain an intellectual relation to them. 
It must deny recognition of  non-enunciative, embodied, intelligently 
performative presence in order to pursue interpretive analytics (Ness 
2011: 25; italics are Ness’s). 
Nor is Ness alone, among dance scholars, in characterising Foucault in 
this way. The positions adopted by dance philosopher Jonathan Owen 
Clark and dance historian Mark Franko, respectively, both writing in 
2011, are illuminating in this respect. According to Clark, bringing a 
Foucauldian lens to dance analysis results in the notion of  an
anonymized ‘subject of  the anunciated,’ – the third-person entity subjected 
to the manipulation of  anti-humanistic and autonomous socio-symbolic 
structures and ideologies beyond its control and/or the human reduced 
to the dispassionate object of  rational scientific study (as in Althusser, 
Foucault, Lacan, etc.).   (Clark 2011: 52).
Franko adopts a somewhat more equivocal stance in relation to the range 
of  possible legacies of  Foucault’s thinking for dance inquiry. On the one 
hand, Franko, writing in the year in which Ness’s article, for which he 
served as editor, also appeared, subscribes to Ness’s position where the 
mature Foucault’s stance vis-à-vis phenomenology is concerned: ‘It 
becomes clear in The Archaeology of  Knowledge that the thesis of  historical 
discontinuity and the critique of  the historical document as a repository 
of  unified intention is also an anti-phenomenological critique of  the 
unified subject (Ness, 2011).’ (Franko 2011: 101). Yet on the other hand, 
Franko seems at the same time sympathetic to the position adopted by 
this present chapter, concerning a perceived over-emphasis, in the dance-
based reception of  Foucault, on the notion of  the Foucauldian body as a 
subjugated surface to be written upon. In this regard Franko makes a point 
very similar to the one argued for in the present text, in suggesting that:
[s]ince Discipline and Punish, when the body and power became Foucault’s 
central focuses, thinking on Foucault and the body has centered perhaps 
excessively on issues of  inscription […]. This idea of  writing on the body’s 
surface in order to engender a style of  movement and of  being has tended 
to dominate the way we read Foucault on embodiment – the problem of  
discipline and agency.  (Franko 2011: 101). 
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Franko suggests that ‘Foucault’s discussion of  art may offer an alternative 
to inscription as the only possible relation of  the body to knowledge’ 
(Franko 2011: 103). Foucault researcher and classicist Richard Alston 
agrees. According to Alston, Foucault, in ‘What is Enlightenment?’,9 
‘offered a seemingly more positive position on agency in modernity […] 
Foucault points to the “asceticism of  the dandy who makes of  his body, 
his behaviour, his feelings and passions his very existence, a work of  art”.’ 
(Alston 2017: 98). Franko has ‘Le corps utopique’ specifically in mind; 
a radio talk broadcast by France Culture in 1966, in which ‘Foucault 
described some dynamic aspects of  corporeality in phenomenological 
terms’ (Franko 2011: 103). Franko points out how, in this interview, 
Foucault’s  
oral rather than written performance suggests the influence of  both Sartre 
and Merleau-Ponty. It is also the only text in which Foucault comments 
(if  only once) directly on dance. ‘Le corps utopique’ explores alternative 
scenarios of  the personal experience of  bodyliness. The entire talk is, in 
fact, a meditation on the body as a medium of  movement in relation to 
desire as a transcendence of  place (lieu) to which our bodies condemn us. 
(Franko 2011: 103). 
Franko, then, is clearly alert to the phenomenological orientation of  
Foucault’s thinking on embodiment. But occurring in 1966, the radio 
interview which serves as Franko’s source in this regard concerns the 
early Foucault. What cannot be as fully gleaned, therefore – at least from 
Franko’s 2011 article, alone – is the extent to which Franko is willing 
to understand Foucault’s predisposition towards phenomenology as 
extending into; enduring in, the later work of  Foucault, and so postdating 
Foucault’s early, and supposedly complete, break with phenomenology.
If  it is initially difficult to reconcile Franko’s characterisation of  
Foucault’s relation to the body, here, as phenomenological, with Ness’s 
assertion that the corporeal is ‘in general’, for Foucault, ‘a kind of  prison’ 
(Ness 2011: 25), this divergence between Franko and Ness’s opinions can 
arguably be accounted for by the different – early and mature – phases in 
Foucault’s intellectual development which their comments respectively 
relate to. Yet in the case of  the divergence between what Ness terms ‘the 
shadow cast’ on embodiment by ‘Foucault’s turn to conceptualism’ (Ness 
2011: 25), on the one hand, and, on the other, the agency which Foucault 
clearly cedes to embodiment in the lectures published as The Courage of  
the Truth, the same chronological gulf  does not apply. For The Courage of  
the Truth is the publication of  the last Collège de France course of  public 
lectures which Foucault gave before his death in 1984. These lectures 
therefore postdate, considerably, Foucault’s ‘turn to conceptualism’. As a 
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broad historical account of  Cynic philosophy as a practice in late ancient 
Greece and Rome, the lectures are representative of  Foucault’s late 
work as a whole. For, according to French philosopher Pascal Michon, 
the late Foucault is typified by ‘studying the technologies of  the self  
during antiquity […] the slow drift of  lifestyles, which the spreading of  
Christianity brutally ended around the end of  the fourth century AD.’ 
(Michon 2002: 179). 
In Ness’s assessment, embodiment, for Foucault is:
in and of  itself  an inherently epistemological reality. It is posited as a 
primordially unknown condition, a way of  being that does not know, yet 
lives. It is not where the intellectual action is, ontologically speaking, in 
relation to conceptual processes. In terms of  reasonableness, it is the dark 
place of  the self  (Ness 2011: 25). 
Yet it is hard to square Ness’s account with Foucault’s historical study 
of  Cynic philosophy in The Courage of  the Truth with its characterisation 
of  the Cynic as the articulation of  parrhēsia – that is, free-spokenness 
and the speaking of  truth to power – expressly enabled by embodied 
agency. Alston, in ‘Foucault’s Empire of  the Free’, his study of  Foucault’s 
late work engagement with the ‘historical specificity’ of  ancient Greece 
and Rome, agrees: ‘In contrast to Foucault’s earlier work on the social 
technologies of  modernity within institutions, focus on the individual 
offered a prospect of  agency and hence a measure of  freedom’ (Alston 
2017: 95). ‘Foucault sees the Greek idea of  parresia as having a close 
relationship to the Roman concept of  libertas’ Alston continues, and in 
parresia, ‘Foucault offers us a model not just of  individual agency, but of  
how philosophy can engage politically’ (Alston 2017: 96; 100). Michon 
does not subscribe to such an unequivocal reading as Ness either and 
here it is worth turning to an extended quotation from his account of  
how, in the late Foucault, the body is understood as both historicised and 
possessive of  agency:
Foucault doesn’t return at the end of  his life, as [Béatrice] Han claims 
through a not always precise reading of  his texts, to the classical conscious, 
reflective and auto-instituted subject. He proposes a real history of  
subjectivation processes, without postulating a transhistorical subjective 
entity. He fully historicizes the subject, the body and the truth. But on the 
other hand, he is far from explaining this history, as Dreyfus and Ijsseling 
say, as a result of  the ‘sending of  the being’, of  an erratic history of  truth 
in time, which man would only passively receive and of  whose actions he 
would be the result. Foucault certainly proposes to historicize the concept 
of  man, to dissolve any transcendental principle through genealogy 
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and archaeology, but this doesn’t lead him, in contrast to Heidegger, to 
abandon the notion of  human liberty for the only liberty of  the being 
(Michon 2002: 184).
Foucault’s early, supposedly decisive and irrevocable, break with 
phenomenology was, also, according to Ness, entirely in keeping with 
Foucault having ‘proclaimed himself  to be a being who loathed spending 
time and/or energy in “nature”, a realm that apparently included the 
motile dimensions of  his own organism.’ (Ness, including quoting David 
Macey, 2011: 20). Against this assessment, however, needs to be set the 
very real importance which the late Foucault, at least, attached to motility 
and to nature. For in Foucault’s eyes, both were intrinsic features of  the 
Cynic life. As such, in Foucault’s estimation, they had been indispensable 
in order for Cynic philosophy to thrive (see Hammond 2017: 23-25; 30-
31).
In Ness’s estimation, alongside Foucault’s ‘rejection of  phenomenology’, 
no field ‘was potentially more foreign to his own understanding, or more 
marginal to the development of  his critical theory, than dance’; his 
‘individual affinity for […] dance was, to put it mildly, minimal’ (Ness 
2011: 20; 21). This makes Foucault, for Ness, very much compromised as 
a thinker to whom dance scholars may wish to turn. In Ness’s evaluation 
the incompatibility of  Foucault and dance rests, to a large extent, on the 
grounds of  Foucault’s supposed complete break with phenomenology. Yet 
Foucault’s turn to history did not, I have tried to suggest, necessarily entail 
as absolute a break with phenomenology as Ness seems to envisage. Nor 
does Ness’s assertion, concerning the extent to which phenomenology 
and history are incommensurate, necessarily hold. Indeed, The Courage 
of  the Truth begs the question of  whether the late Foucault marks a 
return, in some guise, to the phenomenology of  his early career and 
with which he subsequently and apparently so decisively broke. In other 
words, Foucauldian analyses and phenomenology may not necessarily be 
entirely alien to one another, a reading which counters some commonly 
held assumptions concerning their supposed incompatibility. From the 
vantage point of  this re-assessment might spring manifold implications, 
both for the standing of  the ‘historical’ Foucault within Dance Studies 
and, consequently, for Foucault’s perceived utility as a scholar relevant 
to the subject area. For one thing, Foucault might no longer be perceived 
– in view of  his unstinting efforts to track and pursue the implications 
of  the itinerant and therefore incessantly ambulatory Cynic body – as 
insufficiently attentive to the motility of  the body; as having ‘disregarded’ 
the human body’s ‘inherent motility to a nearly absolute extent’ (Ness 
2011: 26). As a consequence, Foucault becomes divested of  some of  
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what Ness terms his ‘anti-phenomenological perspective’ (Ness 2011: 
23). In view of  the re-assessment of  Foucault, especially centred in his 
last Collège de France lecture series, that is offered here, he might be 
turned to once again, and with renewed energy and interest, as a thinker 
with much, methodologically speaking, still to offer to a considered dance 
analysis. 
The interpretation offered above gains added traction from the extent 
to which the question of  Foucault and phenomenology has preoccupied 
scholars working on Foucault, including in the period preceding Ness’s 
evaluation of  Foucault. As Ness points out, in reading ‘Foucault’s 
work [… as] “always defin[ing] itself  against phenomenology”’, ‘May’s 
assessment […] is not without its opponents’ (Ness 2011: 20; note 4, 
29), though Ness does not elaborate upon, or specify, these. The notion of  
‘Foucault’s [continuing] phenomenological heritage’ (Thompson 2008: 
3) does indeed have its detractors, well placed figures such as Foucault 
scholar and philosopher Colin Koopman among them. Yet as Koopman 
acknowledges, ‘a growing body of  interpretive literature concerning the 
work of  Michel Foucault asserts that Foucault’s critical project is best 
interpreted in light of  various strands of  phenomenology’ (Koopman 
2010: 100). Interestingly, May features on Koopman’s list of  ‘other recent 
contributors to this interpretation’. This list, which is not reproduced 
here given its extent, also includes work by Oksala and Thompson on 
which this chapter draws.10 And although May – like Ness – might view 
Foucault’s phenomenological period as an early career phenomenon, 
he considers that Foucault ‘retains what might be called the spirit or 
motivation behind the phenomenological project’ (May 2005: 285). 
It is to work on Foucault’s ‘phenomenological project’, particularly its 
dimensions which pursue Foucault and phenomenology in relation 
to dance, that attention now turns, as part of  this chapter’s unfolding 
project to rehabilitate Foucault, his investment in history especially, for 
Dance Studies.
Redeeming History for Dance Studies                                                                     
ii) Phenomenology, Foucault, Husserl, Dance and History  
In light of  The Courage of  the Truth, it has so far been proposed that 
assertions concerning the extent to which phenomenology and history 
are incommensurate do not necessarily hold. In fact, dance philosopher 
Philipa Rothfield actually proposes turning to historicisation as a means 
of  escaping what is, for her, phenomenology’s universalist bind. In 
Rothfield’s understanding, phenomenological universalism is so troubling 
given what she terms as ‘an ethical danger that corporeal forms of  
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difference which occur within networks of  domination will be elided; that 
the desire to achieve universality will blind itself  to the discriminations 
performed in the name of  sameness.’ (Rothfield 2010: 306).11 ‘Whilst 
phenomenology’ – and here Rothfield has ‘Merleau-Ponty’s sense that 
the world is refracted through our bodily sensibilities’ especially in mind 
– ‘could simply reassert its universalism, it seems to me [writes Rothfield] 
that it has the potential to work through difference by approaching 
lived bodies according to their lived situation’ (Rothfield 2010: 306). In 
Rothfield’s reformulation of  phenomenology, then, history is no longer 
recognisable as the confining straitjacket which renders the experiencing 
– that is, phenomenological – body mute; subjugated; and colonised, in 
the ways that Ness describes. Rather history, in Rothfield’s formulation, 
becomes instead the very lever through which the body’s experience 
is particularised, and attended to, in all its individuality. Moreover, in 
Rothfield’s (re)configuration, phenomenology and history are blended 
expressly to enable a phenomenologically-based investigation of  ethics: 
‘The descent of  phenomenological discourse into the terrain of  social and 
historical articulations is also its entrance into the ethical and political 
complications which characterise social life’, writes Rothfield (Rothfield 
2010: 306-307). And it is especially significant, for the purposes of  this 
chapter, that in advocating for history like this, Rothfield has Foucault 
particularly in mind. It therefore makes sense to consider further, if  only 
in outline given the constraints of  space, Rothfield’s critique. Pausing in 
this way, enables the present discussion to demonstrate how, in Rothfield’s 
estimation, Foucault, and his configuration of  history as genealogy 
in particular, do not stand as obstacles strewn in phenomenology’s 
path, as they do for Ness. Rather, for Rothfield, genealogy, in releasing 
phenomenology from the grip of  universalism, thereby equips 
phenomenology with newfound credentials as a conduit for undertaking 
ethics-based enquiry.  
‘What if  phenomenology were to relinquish the ideal of  universalism, 
recast the lived body in pluralized terms, and aim instead for a regional 
series of  understandings?’; how might that ‘occur in relation to one 
field, that of  dance[?]’ asks Rothfield (Rothfield 2010: 306). Posing this 
question leads Rothfield to identify other, ancillary ones: ‘To what effect 
is the phenomenological project independent of  history? [...] What does 
this say about the “totality” of  dance? Is it “essentially” unaffected by 
historical development?’ she asks (Rothfield 2010: 308). And ‘if  history 
[indeed] impacts upon essence,’ suggests Rothfield by way of  striving 
to answer the questions which she poses herself, ‘then we are returned 
to the Foucauldian formulation: [that is, that the] “putting into play 
of  these universal forms is itself  historical” (Foucault 1984: 355).’ 
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(Rothfield 2010: 310). Rothfield’s elision of  phenomenology and history, 
Foucauldian history especially, is particularly striking in light of  Ness’s 
argument concerning the incommensurability of  phenomenology and 
Foucault. For Ness, the incompatibility of  phenomenology with history 
therefore automatically follows since, in her account, Foucault stands for 
the practice of  history. It is this incommensurability which Rothfield in 
effect, and significantly, overturns. For, in calling for a phenomenology 
that is adequately historicised, Rothfield specifically nominates 
Foucault, as a corrective to curb what she perceives as phenomenology’s 
universalism. Moreover, Rothfield resorts to the historical Foucault; 
reaching out for his notion of  history as genealogy, in particular:
The point is that the experience of  dance, so-called immediate and 
immanent, is shaped by the various fields in which it occurs, and the 
corporeal specificity of  its observers. One way of  putting this is to advocate 
Foucault’s emphasis on the conditions, practices and relations which 
shape ‘the historicity of  forms of  experience’ (Foucault 1984: 334). 
(Rothfield 2010: 310). 
Rothfield turns first to ‘social theorist’ David Hoy (Rothfield 2010: 
303). According to Rothfield, ‘[t]he idea behind Hoy’s proposition is to 
safeguard the phenomenological moment of  analysis whilst juxtaposing 
a Foucauldian genealogical perspective. [...] Foucault functions to 
remind us that the “putting into play” of  universal structures is always 
socio-historically specific’ (Rothfield 2010: 303-304). And as a means 
of  making Foucauldian historicisation available, in practical terms, to 
the phenomenological, experiencing, dancing body, Rothfield proposes 
adopting ethnographer and cultural phenomenologist Thomas Csordas’s 
notion of  ‘somatic attention’. Csordas conceives of  ‘the bodily act of  
perception…as a form of  somatic attention’ (Rothfield: 311). ‘The cultural 
differentiation of  somatic attention’ rests, to quote Csordas, on ‘“culturally 
elaborated ways of  attending to and with one’s body in surroundings that 
include the embodied presence of  others”’ (Csordas quoted in Rothfield 
2010: 311). For Rothfield, Csordas’s ‘cultural differentiation of  somatic 
attention’ is significant because it
marks the descent of  the phenomenological subject into the terrain of  
Foucauldian inscription: ‘…descent attaches itself  to the body. It insinuates 
itself  in the nervous system, in temperament, in the digestive apparatus: 
it appears in faulty respiration, in improper diets.’ (Foucault 1977b: 147). 
(Rothfield 2010: 311).
In turning to Foucault in her self-described ‘attempt a[t] modification 
of  the phenomenological approach’ Rothfield also paves the way to 
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a re-consideration, with dance-based inquiry specifically in mind, of  
the relationship between phenomenology and history more generally 
(Rothfield 2010: 307). And reconsidering the significance of  history 
for phenomenology like this should, by extension, have implications 
for dance history. For if  historicism is shown to be held in high regard 
by phenomenologists, as something that is genuinely useful, even 
indispensable, rather than antagonistic to their project, it would follow 
that the same should apply – more or less – in the case of  Dance Studies, 
given the extent of  its methodological affinity with, and indebtedness to, 
phenomenology. Even the briefest survey of  phenomenologists would 
seem to indicate that conceiving of  the world in inescapably historicist 
terms is an intrinsic dimension of  their respective projects. For Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty, ‘our past is not something that we merely contemplate 
as spectacle but something that is “sedimented” through our bodies, in 
the background to ourselves that we are now’ (Matthews 2002: 96). 
Consequently, ‘a person’s body’ is, according to Merleau-Ponty, the 
‘eloquent relic of  an existence’ (Merleau-Ponty quoted in Matthews 
2002: 93). From this it naturally follows, again to quote Merleau-
Ponty, that ‘time is not an object of  our knowledge but a dimension of  
our [very] being…embodiment and the temporality of  existence are 
thus…inextricably connected’ (Merleau-Ponty quoted in Matthews 
2002: 94). Consequently, philosophers such as Koopman conceive of  
‘a quintessentially phenomenological combination of  “historicity” and 
“transcendentality”’ (Koopman 2013: note 47, 286). 
Whereas in Rothfield’s estimation, Foucauldian models of  history 
enable phenomenology to escape its universalist bind, in phenomenologist 
David Carr’s account of  Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology, the effects 
of  the equation of  history and phenomenology are no less significant, 
even if  they are almost exactly reversed. For in Carr’s understanding, 
historical reduction – as formulated by Husserl, founder of  the twentieth-
century phenomenological movement – ‘offers at least some aid in 
the transcendental project’ (Carr 2009: 263) which was, for Husserl, 
phenomenology’s driving goal. ‘Historical reduction is the philosopher’s 
recounting of  the tradition as it exists in him [or her] through his [or her] 
participation in the historical-cultural milieu’, writes Carr (Carr 2009: 
264). ‘Aiming at the particular’, historical reduction is put in the service of  
transcendental philosophy by ‘bringing to the fore the relevant prejudices 
of  the philosopher’s historical position’ (Carr 2009: 264). ‘[A]s long as 
the results of  historical reduction – in the form of  a characterization 
of  the dominant prejudices of  the philosopher’s age – are clearly before 
his [or her] mind, [(s)]he can at least guard against naïvely giving 
expression to them’, explains Carr (Carr 2009: 264). In this way, here 
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too, historical reduction serves an explicitly ethical dimension. Ethical in 
the sense that historical reduction is directed towards phenomenology 
as transcendental philosophy. For ‘[b]ased as it is upon the recognition 
of  the historicity of  consciousness, of  the role of  historical prejudices 
in conscious life, this reduction consists in the attempt to make those 
prejudices explicit, hold them up to view, retrieve from their habitual 
role as unexamined Selbstverständlichkeiten’ (Carr 2009: 263). Historical 
reduction, then, serves a ‘dual [….and] critical function’. For in helping 
to realise ‘philosophizing, [in which] we are not merely mirroring the 
prejudices of  our age’; ‘it […] holds open the possibility that reflection 
can succeed in arriving at a philosophical description which is not 
encumbered by such prejudices’ (Carr 2009: 63).
Drawing even briefly, as is the case here, from Carr’s account of  Husserl’s 
phenomenology, reveals the extent to which, in Carr’s understanding, 
Husserlian phenomenology’s claims to the status of  transcendental 
philosophy depend precisely on historical reductionism. For Husserl’s 
conceiving of  the world in historical terms like this is, according to Carr, 
with the express intention of  attempting to escape, or avoid repeating, 
history. Or, to put it another way, and turning this time to philosopher 
Kevin Thompson, ‘for Husserl, the historical a priori is the non-historical, 
unchanging transcendentality structure of  history itself: “the living 
movement of  the coexistence and interweaving of  original sense-
production (Sinnbildung) and sense-sedimentation (Sinnsedimentierung)”’ 
(Thompson 2008: 14). Thinking historically, in other words, serves a 
strategic function as part of  Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology, 
enabling philosophy to transcend limitations inherited from the past. 
History, then, was intrinsic to phenomenology from its very foundations 
in Husserl’s transcendentalism. It is similarly gratifying, from the 
vantage point of  a chapter that seeks to validate history as having much, 
methodologically speaking, to offer dance enquiry, that in the context of  
a Dance Studies paradigm heavily indebted to phenomenology, Rothfield 
advocates turning to history specifically. As has been demonstrated, 
Rothfield has resort to Foucauldian models of  history as genealogy 
specifically in mind, as a means of  releasing phenomenology from the 
grip of  universalism. 
Nor is Rothfield alone in this regard: according to phenomenologist 
and Foucault scholar Johanna Oksala, ‘Foucault’s attempt to investigate 
“the historical a priori of  a possible experience” should be read as a 
continuation of  phenomenology in the crucial sense that it attempts 
to radically historicize the transcendental’ (Oksala 2012: 533). 
Oksala belongs to what Koopman has described as ‘a general strategy 
of  reinterpretation of  Foucault through the lens of  phenomenological 
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concepts like historic-transcendentality [that] is gaining increasing 
attention among Foucault scholars today’ (Koopman 2010: 105; italics 
are Koopman’s). And in Oksala’s understanding, as in Rothfield’s, it is 
precisely Foucault’s commitment to history that enables his contribution 
to phenomenology’s development, ‘continu[ing] the phenomenological 
project in important ways’ (Oksala 2012: 528). For ‘while it is impossible 
to study the conditions of  possibility of  our own thought, it is possible to 
reveal the fundamental structures determining the order of  knowledge of  
a different age’ (Oksala 2012: 534). It is through an insistence that the 
transcendental is always historical, and so must be historicised, in other 
words, that Foucault’s ‘method does thus not mark any straightforward 
continuation of  the project of  Husserlian phenomenology, but rather 
continues its critical development’ (Oksala 2012: 528). In this vein, for 
instance, Thompson, quoting from the The Archaeology of  Knowledge, 
understands Foucault’s 
archaeology [a]s thereby a phenomenology of  the concept – it ‘describes 
discourses as practices specified in the element of  the archive’ (AS 
[L’archéologie de savoir], 173/131) and this means, that at its core, it thinks 
transcendentality and historicity together as the stratum of  the positivity 
of  knowledge  (Thompson 2008: 17).
From this it would follow that abandoning history, at least Foucauldian 
history, should not be the price automatically exacted from Dance Studies 
for its embrace of  phenomenology. Engagement with one need not be at 
the expense of  the other. For dance’s claims to phenomenological status 
are not necessarily threatened by history and are, perhaps, rather even 
bolstered or extended by it. And as the first part of  this chapter sought 
to demonstrate, Cultural Studies advocated a modification of, rather 
than retreat from, historical method. So, by the same logic, allegiance to 
Cultural Studies does not demand the disregard of  history. In historicising 
Dance Studies’ emergence and methodological indebtedness to Cultural 
Studies and phenomenology alike, this chapter has set out to equip the 
discipline with a genealogy of  its own intellectual inheritances. This 
has been with a view to suggesting that history might be (re)turned to, 
and with renewed energy and interest, as possessing much of  worth, 
methodologically speaking, still to offer to a considered investigation of  
dance. The respective positions consistently adopted vis-à-vis history by 
some key, foundational figures – and now, present-day scholars and artist-
scholars – in both Cultural Studies and phenomenology, would seem 
to bear out, and support, the vindication and recuperation of  history 
in the ways which this chapter has argued. Carr, for example, ‘think[s] 
the term “historicity” is the key to understanding’... ‘phenomenological 
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encounters’: ‘In various ways [Carr continues] phenomenologists have 
recognised and given an account of  the thoroughly historical character 
of  consciousness, experience and human existence’ (Carr 2012: 240-
241). 
Added to which, condemning Foucault and Foucauldian histories 
would risk allying Dance Studies with some unlikely intellectual 
bedfellows. This chapter has shown how Foucault has been discounted 
for dance research on the grounds of  an ‘excessive’ preoccupation with 
history. However it is perhaps helpful to recall, that he has, somewhat 
paradoxically, often been dismissed by the historical establishment, on 
the grounds of  not being historical enough: ‘Foucault is thus regarded by 
the majority of  conservative as well as mainstream historians as anti-
historical’ (Munslow 1997: 120). Ness’s comment, quoting philosopher 
Gary Gutting, that ‘particularly in the discipline of  history, Foucault’s 
work is judged, even by its supporters as “seriously wanting”’ might 
usefully be brought into consideration here’ (Ness 2011: 20). In his 
study ‘of  the reception of  Foucault by historians [which is understood 
as] fall[ing] into three stages…of  “non-reception”, “confrontation” and, 
finally, “assimilation”’, historian Allan Megill, writing in 1987, observed 
that indeed ‘the[ir] main complaint is perspectival and methodological’ 
(Megill 1987: 125; 132). This criticism can be understood as arising 
at least in part – and again to quote Megill – from the extent to which 
Foucault ‘himself  underlined his difference from disciplinary history, and 
rightly so, for he stands apart from the generally unquestioned conceptual 
and methodological assumptions that define its boundaries’ (Megill 
1987: 117). Other similarly well-placed commentators on Foucault and 
the historical community agree. For O’Brien, key Foucault works ‘are self-
proclaimed histories. Yet they are not “generic” products of  the historical 
discipline’ (O’Brien 1989: 32). And according to Thomas Flynn, for whom 
‘all of  Foucault’s major works are histories of  a sort, which is enough to 
make him a historian of  a sort’, Foucault’s ‘archaeology is both counter-
history and social critique. It is counter-history because it assumes a 
contrapunctal relationship to traditional history’ (Flynn 2005: 29; 33; 
italics are Flynn’s). 
To join ‘mainstream historians’ in their disregard for Foucault, would 
therefore actually bring Dance Studies into some unexpected allegiance 
with the very establishment mainstream which Stuart Hall had sought 
to break away from, so decisively, in founding ‘Birmingham School’ 
Cultural Studies in the first place. In disdaining Foucault and Foucauldian 
histories, therefore, Dance Studies risks disregarding, even reneging upon, 
one of  the founding tenets of  its Cultural Studies parent. A strong case 
for retaining history – Foucauldian histories in particular – for Dance 
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Studies can be built on these grounds alone. And yet in making that case, 
this chapter’s aim has not been to shift, unambiguously, the status of  
Foucault for Dance Studies from that of  proscribed to prescribed thinker. 
For one thing, to do so would be to fly in the face of  Hall’s very ‘mode of  
thinking’; to disregard his eschewal of  ‘closure and certainty’ (Slack and 
Grossberg in Hall 2016: xi). Rather, in formulating arguments for the 
possible rehabilitation of  Foucault, and so history, for Dance Studies, this 
chapter itself  arguably adopts a somewhat Hallian position. It therefore 
seems appropriate to give the last word to Hall. Hall, note Jennifer Daryl 
Slack and Lawrence Grossberg, ‘was an essayist’: 
Essays are specific interventions into specific intellectual debates, and 
into specific historical and political contexts. They do not create fixed 
and universal positions; they are not finished statements, for they are 
always open to revision as new intellectual resources become available, 
as historical contexts change, and as the relations of  power (domination 
and resistance, containment, and struggle) face new challenges. This was 
Hall’s mode of  thinking…  (Slack and Grossberg in Hall 2016: x-xi).
This chapter is offered in this same spirit of  the inherent contingency of  
Cultural Studies that is the hallmark of  Hall’s thinking. Sharing Hall’s 
reluctance to ‘police the [disciplinary] boundaries’, and drawing upon 
‘new intellectual resources [that have recently] become available’, it is 
conceived as one such contribution to ‘specific interventions into specific 
[Dance Studies] intellectual debates’ (Slack and Grossberg in Hall 2016: 
xiv; x). Indeed, in debating history for Dance Studies, this chapter is 
involved, in effect, in the extension to Dance Studies, of  the same ‘process 
of  continuous theorizing’ through which ‘Cultural Studies constitutes 
itself ’ (Slack and Grossberg in Hall 2016: xi).    
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Notes
1 This re-titling of  the programme is, perhaps, especially poignant given that 
California/Riverside had hosted the ‘Choreographing History’ conference in 
1992. See Choreographing History, edited by Susan Leigh Foster, Bloomington 
and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1995.
2 In Stuart Hall’s recollection: ‘Later Thompson made it clear that he hated 
Cultural Studies…he [Thompson] ripped us up and set out to destroy one of  his 
greatest devotees, Richard Johnson. This was a savage, savage attack, and it 
represented a parting of  the ways. We never really got it together again.’ (Hall 
with Schwarz 2017: 265).
3 This is the manuscript version, made digitally available by the author, of  
McRobbie, Angela (2016) ‘Stuart Hall: Art and the Politics of  Black Cultural 
Production’, South Atlantic Quarterly 114 (4), pp. 665-683.
4 Hall’s ‘Cultural Identity and Diaspora’ essay was originally published in 
Identity: Community, Culture, Difference, ed. Jonathan Rutherford, London: 
Lawrence and Wishart, 1990, pp. 222-237.
5 See May 2005 in the Reference list.
6 Translated by Alan Sheridan. New York: Vintage Books, 1978. Henceforth to 
be referred to as Discipline and Punish.
7 Michel Foucault, Les aveaux de la chair [Confessions of  the Flesh]: Histoire de la 
sexualité 4, edited by  Frédéric Gros, Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 2018.
8 For a fuller account of  the extended analysis of  Cynic philosophy presented 
in Foucault’s The Courage of  the Truth and its strong interconnection with, and 
implications for, embodied agency and dance inquiry, see Hammond 2017, 
especially pp. 23-42.
9 This Foucault text is included in Paul Rabinow, The Foucault Reader, New 
York: Pantheon Books, 1984, pp. 32-50.
10 For this list, see Koopman 2010, note 9, p. 105. For additional ‘contributors 
to this interpretation’, see Thompson 2008, note 1, p. 3. Subsequent and valuable 
further contributions to this debate include Thompson 2010 (a response to 
Koopman 2010); and Koopman 2010b (a response, in turn, to Thompson 2010). 
11 Citations to Rothfield’s text are to its inclusion in The Routledge Dance Studies 
Reader. It had originally been published, under the same title given to the chapter 
in that volume – ‘Differentiating Phenomenology and Dance’ – in the philosophy 
journal Topoi (2005) 24, pp. 43-53.
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